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SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND LATE IMPERIAL HISTORY 
 
FRANCESCA BRAY 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
As illustrated in the work of Elman and his school, the demystification of science has 
opened new vistas in the history of late imperial China. I argue that the similarly 
demystified concept of technology, as it is has recently been elaborated in technology 
studies, offers equally exciting new opportunities. They include an enrichment of our 
understanding of late imperial governance, subjectivities and material culture, and 
new possibilities for organizing, relating and comparing within the history of China, 
as well as for cross-cultural comparison. The article proposes three organizing 
concepts, technological landscape, culture, and era/mode, as tools both for exploring 
late imperial China and for linking China into comparative or global history. 
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Benjamin Elman’s meticulous explorations of scientific cultures have set the tone for 
a radical reframing of how we study late imperial China. Rather than treating science 
as a specialised epistemological domain set apart from ordinary lives and logics, 
Elman and his school propose science as integral to society, probing the nature of 
knowledge clusters, exploring how such technical fields of expertise as philology and 
mathematics, medicine and cosmology interwove, and demonstrating how they 
suffused statecraft, politics and culture.  
 
In redefining the nature and scope of technical knowledge and expert practices, the 
new historiography of science in China draws inspiration from the broader field of 
critical science studies that has likewise revolutionised and democratised the history 
of science in the West, while opening the door to societies previously dismissed as 
having no real science of their own.  
 
As a result, comparative history of science also gains new possibilities. Instead of 
propounding Western exceptionalism, the empirical and interpretative foundations 
are laid for much more interesting and productive exercises. Rather than judging and 
ranking, symmetrical comparisons can become the goal, adopting an anthropological 
approach that asks how different societies address common problems such as dealing 
with uncertainty, constituting a scientific corpus or demonstrating a mathematical 
proof. Typically, in the process of sustained and non-judgemental comparisons of 
this kind, assumptions are shaken and paradigms challenged for each and every 
knowledge culture explicitly or implicitly included in the comparison, including that 
omni-present referent, the European or Western tradition.1 
 
The analysis of encounters, exchanges and impact is similarly reconfigured when 
science is treated as a universal, embedded human activity. Elman’s On Their Own 
Terms is a fine example.2 The European concept of science and its corresponding 
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hierarchies and clusters of knowledge were first introduced to Chinese intellectuals 
by the Jesuits. Noting that right up to the debacle of the Sino-Japanese War the 
intrinsic superiority of Western knowledge remained open to debate among its 
Chinese interlocutors, Elman argues persuasively for treating the period from 1550 to 
1900 as a continuum marked by sustained creative dialogue between knowledge 
systems, a period throughout which “science” was at the foreground of intellectual 
and political concerns in China. In order to understand both the history of those 
crucial centuries and the significance of science in modern and contemporary China, 
Elman argues, we need to look closely at how late imperial Chinese thinkers 
produced their own “science”.  
 
Demystifying science and incorporating science-studies approaches into Chinese 
history has helped build a flourishing field whose power to illuminate the workings 
of imperial society at all levels is vividly illustrated in the five case-studies presented 
here by Elman’s former students. Yet despite equally exciting and transformative 
new directions in the broader fields of technology studies and history of technology, 
historians of pre-industrial China have so far shown little enthusiasm for mobilising 
technology as a heuristic.3 In what follows I first ask why this might be, then propose 
the case for demystifying technology and integrating it into China’s social, cultural 
and political history. I suggest that three concepts recently elaborated in technology 
studies – technological landscapes, technological cultures and technological eras – 
could usefully serve both for internal and comparative / global.  
 
The problem concerning technology 
 
As Nathan Sivin tartly noted some time ago, asking why something didn’t happen is 
far less likely to produce interesting history than asking what did —the principle on 
which most historians of China sensibly enough work.4 Given how technology has 
been used and abused in constructing grand narratives for China’s past, it is not 
surprising that most of them regard the term with misgiving, or dismiss it as the 
necessary yet culturally uninteresting nuts and bolts that hold a material culture or 
socio-economic system in place. Although they readily engage with other equally 
anachronistic concepts and categories like science, gender, religion, art, philosophy, 
law, property, society or the state, many of which have also been mobilized in the 
past to bolster evolutionary arguments about Western superiority, today none of these 
terms seems quite so distorting of Chinese realities, so tainted with positivist agendas 
and freighted with negative baggage, as technology. In consequence very few 
historians of China have so far engaged with innovative or critical approaches within 
the history and sociology of technology.5  
 
In part this is an internalist, sinological issue: we are tired of parrying the “Needham 
Question”, wearied by the apparently unquenchable stream of media claims that the 
Chinese invented everything from the compass to the flush toilet; most of us are 
happy to leave “great divergence” debates to the economic or world historians. We 
find other angles on what made imperial China tick more exciting, and more fruitful. 
But equally important is the very narrow view of what technology is and means, and 
how to identify and study it, that still prevails, limiting our imagination of what 
history of technology could bring to the study of late imperial China.  
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We live in a world where most people, from technocrats to schoolchildren to 
academics, believe that technology means iPhones and biotech but not refrigerators, 
string or latrines; that technology is culture-free and politics-free; that it is a force 
irresistibly propelling us into the future; and that its history confirms that West is 
Best (while nervously recognizing that the East is Catching Up Fast). The most 
popular and influential works in history of technology offer a cornucopia of heroic 
stories and cultural explanations to confirm this view.6 As a discipline, the history of 
technology emerged as an enterprise charting the roots and the rise of the modern 
West and its path to world supremacy.7 Even today, the bulk of its scholarship still 
focuses on modern industrial societies, on trains, planes and automobiles, 
electrification and nuclear plants, asbestos and rare earths, the training of engineers 
and the advances of robotics – in other words, on activities and artifacts recognised 
as key to the shaping of modernity. The field is still marked, moreover, by a strong 
emphasis on innovation, thus apparently endorsing the popular view that history is 
structured by a succession of (predominantly Western) inventions catalyzing 
economic growth, social transformation and societal progress.8 One can understand 
why historians of imperial China are seldom tempted to dabble in these waters.  
 
But the caricatural outline I have just presented falls far short of the richness of 
technology studies today. It has become a highly interdisciplinary and 
methodologically sophisticated field, drawing on critical theory, cultural studies, 
feminism, anthropology, literary criticism, aesthetics and environmental history to 
interface with the more established input from engineering, sociology, business 
history, urban studies or material science. As in history and social science more 
generally, technology studies has embraced the turn from production to consumption 
as constitutive moment, and has become deeply concerned with meanings and 
subjectivities.  
 
Inventors have not disappeared from our research, but must jostle for attention with 
users or refusers. An engineer’s blue-print is read not just for its technical content but 
simultaneously for its aesthetic or its politics. “Efficiency” is deconstructed and 
contextualized. Humble “everyday technologies” like bicycles or corrugated iron are 
given star roles. We ask how women, children and non-whites became excluded from 
the circle of recognized technical experts.9 Histories of gas and electricity compare 
the sensibilities and subjectivities expressed in lighting choices for domestic, public 
or official settings in London, St Petersburg or Istanbul.10 Different phases of statism 
in France are examined through grand projects: the building of the Canal du Midi 
under Louis XIV; changes in gun manufacture through the 1789 Revolution and into 
the Empire; nuclear power in the reconstitution of the French nation post-WWII.11 In 
a tantalizing echo of recent investigations of the bound foot, one recent study 
analyzes the pointe ballet shoes used by Balanchine’s New York City Ballet as ‘a 
technology of artistic production and bodily discipline’, supporting a dancing style 
that ‘emerged from uniquely twentieth-century systems of labor and production’.12 
 
In addition, historians of technology are now becoming interested in what we might 
call après-innovation, in the immense efforts and resources necessary to keep things 
working. Continuity, from this perspective, is not the natural order of things; 
maintenance is the essential analytical counterpart of innovation and construction.13 I 
would take this insight still further. Whether in the historical past or in today’s 
society, one important function of technology is maintaining stability, not simply 
 4 
material stability (a reliable supply of energy; dykes that resist flood tides; food 
preservation to smooth over seasonal shortages), but also political, social and cultural 
stability (weapons to protect borders and keep ruling regimes in power; phones and 
apps that allow migrant workers to keep in regular touch with their families – or their 
historical equivalents, including ancestral altars or tombs through which the living 
communicate with the dead). As material objects and practices that tacitly express 
shared values and beliefs, technologies can be a powerful force for anchoring 
institutions, promoting stability through times of upheaval or change. No less energy 
and creativity go into maintaining continuity, stability and cohesion than into 
triggering disintegration or revolution, and no less careful explanation is required. 
This adaptive or conservative potential is an aspect of technology that has been 
largely ignored, yet it is, to my mind, one of its most interesting features, and offers 
one promising way to think about technology in late imperial context.14  
 
Materialities of governance, material cultures of subjectivity: these are surely themes 
with inherent appeal for historians of late imperial China. There is no shortage of 
sources we can profitably explore, or of relevant studies already published, even if 
few of them as yet are couched in terms of technology. Now let me suggest some 
strategies for organising these resources and bringing them into conversation. 
 
Technological landscapes and cultures  
 
In its broadest anthropological definition, technology denotes ways of making and 
doing. From the anthropological perspective technology is not an automatic force for 
progress, an attribute of trained specialists or superior civilisations, but a ‘material 
manifestation of the various ways men and women throughout time have chosen to 
define and pursue existence’.15 Thus defined, technology constitutes a robust 
conceptual tool for rethinking history, encouraging us to explore how societies 
translated goals, values and regimes of power into material practices and artifacts.  
 
Every society uses tools and technical skills to produce a characteristic life-style, a 
world that is at once material, social and symbolic. It builds a repertoire of skilled 
material practices and artifacts to produce food, shelter and clothing; to 
communicate; to control; to distinguish rank and gender, native and foreign, civilised 
and uncouth; to worship, to fight or to trade – what we might call its technological 
landscape.16 It also develops characteristic ideas about the forces mobilised by 
technological activities of various kinds; about how, whether and to what ends they 
should or should not be used; the nature of their effects; and their political, moral or 
metaphysical significance – its technological culture.17 Technological landscape and 
technological culture are co-constitutive. The technological landscape (resources, 
materials, skills, artefacts) offers the material and mental conditions of possibility for 
the technological culture; the technological culture (goals, values, ideas about what 
can be done and how) shapes the imaginaries and the resources that go into 
reproducing, modifying and/or developing the technological landscape.  
 
Neither technological landscape nor technological culture will be homogeneous in 
any society. The technological landscape will include multiple, distinct or 
overlapping repertoires and assemblages of materials, tools, skills, knowledge and 
styles. Whether in ancient or modern societies we observe non-synchronicities where 
old and new, more or less advanced technologies co-exist, serving different 
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functions, regions or groups – in medieval England, for example, the short-bow and 
the long-bow, the domestic quern and the manorial mill, or in China today the high-
speed train, the bicycle and the wheel-barrow, the microwave and the wok.18 
 
Technological cultures vary also,  within or between groups or domains of expertise. 
In today’s neoliberal economies, for instance, corporations are likely to argue 
strongly that innovation should proceed unimpeded as it will ultimately benefit 
society, while environmentalists press for the precautionary principle to be applied. 
In sixteenth-century China, in confrontations recalling the differences between 
modern American and Dutch philosophies of flood-control analyzed by Bijker, 
imperial officials and hydraulic experts argued over two incompatible models of 
flood-control policy: either wait till an emergency threatens and then deep-dredge the 
waterways as rapidly as possible, or allocate regular amounts of money and 
manpower for routine maintenance and improvement of the channels and dykes.19  
 
The concept of technological landscape was initially proposed by Svante Lindqvist 
as a corrective to the presentism of innovation-focused history of technology. Wiebe 
Bijker offered technological culture as a way to analyze and contrast the value 
systems, risk perception and power relations embedded in such seemingly similar 
and neutral products of modern engineering as the dykes of the Netherlands and the 
levees of New Orleans. Both concepts were initially developed as ripostes to the 
universalizing, depoliticizing, innovation-obsessed claims of modern technocracy, 
but their potential for illuminating earlier histories and deeper historical legacies is 
immediately apparent. Adding my own anthropological twist on what falls within the 
purview of technological matters, I have found both concepts useful for illuminating 
aspects of late imperial history, as well as continuities and ruptures between imperial 
and modern China, and for locating China helpfully in world history.20 
 
Lindqvist argues that in the contemporary, industrial world, technological landscapes 
change much more slowly than we might conclude from a narrow focus on 
innovations. Historians of technology often single out one technology or a closely-
knit cluster of technical activities for study. But a fuller tour d’horizon is called for, a 
more detailed mapping of the contours and defining features of the broad 
technological landscape, its diversity of technologies and technical resources, its 
superimposed or interdigitated layers of old technologies and new (what philosophers 
of technology call non-synchronicities21), its centres, hinterlands and peripheries, its 
knowledge clusters and the linkages between different technologies, if we wish to 
understand the role and significance attributed to our chosen technology within its 
social context, its patterns of change, and its systemic impact.  
 
As an example, Christian Daniels has drawn attention to the cheap, simple and 
flexible “technological kit” characteristic of the imperial countryside.22 The kit 
included farming tools, notably iron hoes or mattocks and the iron turnplow. The 
turnplow was ideally suited to rice-farming; it was also key in much commercial 
cropping, allowing sugar-farmers for example to pursue an intensive cultivation 
system based on regular spacing of the canes along ridges separated by drainage 
furrows - a productive system much admired by Europeans used to broadcast fields; 
and it was an essential tool; it was used by miners (who were often farmers adding to 
their income in the off-season) to extract coal or iron-ore lying close to the surface 
and by the ceramics industry to obtain clay. The corresponding “manufacturing kit” 
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included the Chinese stove and wok; processes of steaming to extract oil or juice; the 
use of lime as a reagent; and trip-hammers, edge-runner mills, and eventually the 
roller-mill (apparently derived from the cotton-gin) to express juice or oil from the 
raw materials.  
 
The complete “technological kit” suited small-scale production admirably: it was 
cheap and easy to construct; it could be transported from field to field, between farms 
and workshops, or from river valleys up onto steep mountain slope; and it did not 
require any concentration of labor to operate. The characteristics of this technological 
kit, the ease with which it could penetrate new environments (compared, for 
example, to the much weightier, more expensive and specialized equipment typical 
of advanced farming in early modern Europe), or switch between rice, sugar, pepper 
or clay production, fundamentally shaped the farming and manufacturing landscapes 
of imperial China and its demographic patterns. 
 
In addition to highlighting uneveness and heterogeneity, the concept of technological 
landscape also prompts us to think about technology as a force for cohesion, where 
potentially disruptive transformations in one technical domain are contained through 
adjustments in others, or channeled through or into existing infrastructures, material 
or institutional – integrative processes that in modern context can be described as 
system-building.23  
 
In pre-industrial societies such equilibration occurred less frequently through 
deliberate intervention and coordination than through more organic processes of 
adjustment. These have been a core theme in my own studies of the role of 
technology in the long-term survival of the Chinese late-imperial order. The gradual 
diffusion of shared norms for domestic architecture, incorporating ancestral altars 
and the segregation of the sexes, was neither planned nor enforced but rather a case 
of what Veblen termed emulation. But technocratic intervention was also a key 
element. The late imperial technological landscape was elaborate and diverse. It 
contained sophisticated technologies such as canals, chain suspension bridges, water-
mills and irrigation pumps, lofty buildings, productive farming, textiles of every 
kind, an abundance of fine china-ware and a thriving print industry. But rich and 
sophisticated regions co-existed with impoverished backwaters. One of the enduring 
concerns of imperial statecraft was to improve life in poor or vulnerable regions. 
State officials regularly deployed technology (building flood barriers, setting up 
sericultural projects or public granaries, disseminating new crop plants, etc) to 
improve local living conditions. The goal was not simply material: replacing local 
tillage implements and textile equipment with central Chinese plows and looms was 
considered an effective way to mold non-Chinese into good Chinese subjects; 
encouraging peasants to adhere to the canonical divisions of labor and of domestic 
space tied ignorant rustics into webs of orthodoxy.24  
 
This example confirms that to understand the work that technology does in any 
specific context, we need to ask not only how it performs materially, but also how it 
contributes to building a political, social and symbolic order. Material production is 
intimately entangled with meaning and value. This is where the concept of 
technological culture comes into play. We as historians will wish to enquire into our 
historical actors’ beliefs about which technologies are important and why; about their 
significance, nature and impact; about the forces they mobilise and the sources of 
 7 
technical skills. The value attributed to a certain kind of work, or skill, or product, 
may or may not include an estimation of economic worth or material efficacy, in 
addition to beliefs about its symbolic, political, social or aesthetic value. The 
significance, and the value, attributed to a particular technology or technical skill 
may change radically over time, or when a commodity or a technology moves across 
borders.  
 
Let me give a couple of examples. When the Spanish conquered the Inka empire they 
took over the exploitation of its gold and silver mines. Silver and gold played a key 
role in Inka government, not as inert metals but as living forces creating wealth and 
strength. The living Inka was carried through the streets on a palanquin that made of 
silver alloyed with gold, glittering like the sun. Alloys were more highly prized than 
pure metals, for they symbolised the blending of peoples under Inka rule. The Inka 
rulers valued the silver from one mine, at Porco, especially highly for its “extremely 
white” color. The white Porco silver was especially precious to the Inka because its 
whiteness betokened the lightning, the weapon of the supreme deity who bestowed 
fertility, wealth and military success. The Spanish also esteemed the Porco silver 
highly, but not because they attached any religious importance to it. To the Spanish, 
whiteness signalled high metallic purity and greater monetary worth.  
 
The Spanish metric of metallic purity as value is current. However, modern views are 
quite at variance with another core value of the technological culture of the Spanish 
empire. Economic historians observe that the Spanish, unlike the Dutch or the 
Japanese, did not spend their silver wealth wisely. They did not invest in technical or 
institutional innovations, they did not finance improvements in agriculture or 
industry. Instead of using capital to generate wealth by developing the means of 
production, the Spanish monarchs of the Golden Age fostered what Thomas Misa 
calls “technologies of the court”,25 technologies that consumed rather than generating 
wealth. American silver paid for Spanish palaces, cathedrals and roads, for 
bureaucratic salaries, patronage of the arts and royal regalia, but above all for soldiers 
and sailors, ships and guns. The Spanish monarchs thirsted for glory: their mission 
was to stamp out the Reformation and to rule as the foremost power in Europe. To 
this end they went deeply into debt for wars that they ultimately lost. By today’s 
economistic standards, the Spanish simply wasted their silver.  
 
Let me turn to an equally striking rupture in technological culture in China, whereby 
weaving women were transformed, almost overnight, from virtuous subjects to 
transgressive citizens.26 ‘Men plough, women weave’ (nangeng nüzhi 男耕女織) was 
a mantra for state officials and ordinary folk alike in imperial China: men’s work in 
the fields fed the family and the empire, women’s work at spindle and loom, carried 
out within the house, clothed them. Weaving skills were a mark of virtuous and 
productive womanhood in China for at least 2,000 years, and handloom weaving by 
village women continued to provide a significant portion of China’s textile needs 
through the Republican era.  
 
All this suddenly changed in the 1950s and 1960s under the revolutionary policies of 
the People’s Republic of China. Women were to be liberated by integrating them into 
the public workforce. Textile production was to be industrialized. As cotton cloth 
was one of the fledgling nation’s few reliable foreign-currency earners, cotton-
growers were expected to hand over their whole crop for industrial processing, and 
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peasant families were only allowed to keep a kilo or two for domestic use. The 
exigencies of female liberation, industrialization and nation-building led to official 
condemnation and suppression of homespun production, driving women weavers, so 
to speak, underground. What used to be socially valued work was now a 
transgression. 
 
Technological eras or modes 
 
Another fruitful concept that could usefully be adapted in late imperial context is the 
concept of eras, as propounded by Thomas Misa in Leonardo to the ’Internet.27 
Including chapters on ‘Technologies of the Court’ and ‘Techniques of Commerce’ in 
addition to more familiar tropes of ‘Geographies of Industry’,28(with beer and 
brewing in a starring role), ‘Instruments of Empire’ and ‘Means of Destruction’, 
Misa’s book is a stimulating example of how taking technological cultures and 
landscapes seriously breathes new life into old narratives about the rise of the West. 
It also raises intriguing possibilities for developing local histories of technology, as 
well as for cross-cultural comparison.  
 
As Eda Kranakis notes in her review of the book, Misa’s approach to eras ‘draws on 
the tradition of political economy’ yet ‘takes an essential step beyond the myth of 
economic man’.29 Misa identifies a sequence of eras whose time-frames do not 
always coincide with conventional historical divisions. They are characterized by key 
preoccupations or institutions, and Misa links each to a corresponding repertory of 
key technologies. Rather than arguing that technological developments drove the 
evolution of social and political institutions, ‘Misa’s model shows technical eras 
arising out of – and in relation to – specific political and cultural systems. This 
difference is fundamental, and Misa’s approach therefore provides new insights 
about the ways in which societies choose and use technologies’.30  
 
Thus, Misa’s  essay on ‘Techniques of commerce’ in Holland in the Golden Age 
portrays it as thoroughly capitalist but not industrial society: its technical 
developments are better understood not as steps along a unilinear pan-European 
progress towards industrial mechanization, but rather as a spectrum of efforts to 
develop the technologies of commerce, in a network linking ship-building and 
financial tools with new processes for the refinement of sugar or weaving of 
cashmere. ‘These technologies not only set the stage for a Dutch commercial 
hegemony that lasted roughly a century; they also shaped the character of Dutch 
society and culture at all levels and across the entire country.’31 To my mind this 
strongly evokes the impact of Daniels’ “technological kit” on regimes of production 
and consumption in late imperial China. I would love to see a corresponding study of 
‘Techniques of commerce’ for the Ming and Qing. 
 
Misa’s European eras are presented, unsurprisingly, as a chronological sequence and 
indeed they demonstrate a logic of chronological and technical development, from 
commercial to industrial capitalism and imperialism. I think it would not be 
impossible to trace a useful succession of technological eras in Chinese history that 
could provide illuminating perspectives on society and culture. But Misa’s eras are 
also modes or styles, often overlapping in a single society. In most countries of 
ancien régime Europe ‘technologies of the court’ overlapped with, competed with, or 
drove ‘techniques of commerce’. In the case of imperial China, we might investigate 
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the shifting interplay through the early modern period between  ‘technologies of the 
state’, ‘technologies of the court’ and ‘technologies of commerce/work’.32  In 
comparative vein, it would also be interesting to compare technologies of the court in 
early Ming and early Qing China, or in early Qing China and France at the same 
period.33 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The demystification of science has opened new vistas in the history of late imperial 
China. I argue that the similarly demystified concept of technology, as it is has 
recently been elaborated in technology studies, offers equally exciting new 
opportunities. They include an enrichment of our understanding of late imperial 
governance, subjectivities and material culture, and new possibilities for organizing, 
relating and comparing within the history of China, as well as for cross-cultural 
comparison. 
 
Here I have proposed three concepts, technological landscape, culture, and era/mode, 
as tools both for exploring China and for linking China into comparative or global 
history. While never losing sight of the material affordances and restrictions that 
shape technological action, these anthropological approaches to technology as 
culture, as an embedded element of all aspects of human life and as a material vector 
of regimes of power, undermine the previous analytical chasm between pre-modern 
and industrial societies. They challenge the ‘idea of a great divide between modern 
and pre-modern knowledge systems’, or of historically significant versus ‘outside of 
modern’ technologies.34 Their ontological approach to the work that technologies do 
in a specific social and material context allows us to bypass the compulsive 
teleologies of typical global or world history, obsessed as they still are with great 
divergences and convergences.  
 
The concepts of technological landscape, culture or era/mode do not rule out an 
interest in innovation, but are equally attentive to the energy, ingenuity and skills that 
go into maintaining stability, and to the role of technologies, present as well as past, 
in social and cultural reproduction. In other words, as applied even to modern 
industrial societies, they call upon us to look at significance, efficacy and meaning 
differently. If we take this approach seriously, whether we are looking at the late 
imperial printing industry, at contemporary nuclear engineering or at the life-style of 
palaeolithic hunter-gatherers, we are prompted to question each from the perspective 
of the other. Symmetrical historical comparisons of this kind are valuable because 
they challenge our assumptions both about the past that we study, and about the 
present in which we live.   
 
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR  
 
Francesca Bray is …. 
 
Correspondence to: …  
 
 
 10 
                                                 
1 On divination and risk see the work of the Erlangen International Consortium 
on Fate, freedom and prognostication: strategies for coping with the future in East 
Asia and Europe; http://www.ikgf.uni-erlangen.de/ accessed 12 February 2017. 
On building a corpus, see Florence Bretelle-Establet (ed), Looking at it from Asia: 
The Processes that Shaped the Sources of History of Science, Springer, 2010. On 
mathematical proof see Karine Chemla (ed), The History of Mathematical Proof 
in Ancient Traditions, Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
2 Benjamin Elman, On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900, Harvard 
University Press, 2005. 
3 Dagmar Schäfer (ed), Cultures of Knowledge: Technology in Chinese History, 
Brill: 2012. At the workshop where these papers were first presented, it proved 
extremely difficult to convince most of the contributors that they were writing 
about technology. 
4 Nathan Sivin, ‘Why the Scientific Revolution did not take place in China – or 
didn’t it?’ Chinese Science 5 (1982): 45-66. 
5 See Francesca Bray, Technology, Gender and History in Imperial China: Great 
Transformations Reconsidered, Routledge, 2013: 23. 
6 E.g. David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and 
Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, Cambridge 
University Press, 1969; Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Creativity and Economic 
Progress, Oxford University Press, 1990. 
7 John S. Staudenmaier, S.J., Technology’s Storytellers: Reweaving the Human 
Fabric, MIT Press, 1985. 
8 David Edgerton, ‘From innovation to use: ten eclectic theses on the 
historiography of technology’, History and Technology, 16, no. 2 (1999): 111-136. 
9 Jennifer Karns Alexander, The mantra of efficiency: From waterwheel to social 
control, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008; David Edgerton, The Shock of the 
Old: Technology and global history since 1900, Profile Books, 2011; David Arnold 
and Erich DeWald, ‘Cycles of empowerment? The bicycle and everyday 
technology in colonial India and Vietnam’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 53.04 (2011): 971-996; Nina E. Lerman, ‘”Preparing for the Duties and 
Practical Business of Life": Technological Knowledge and Social Structure in 
Mid-19th-Century Philadelphia’, Technology and Culture 38.1 (1997): 31-59; 
Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch, How users matter: the co-construction of 
users and technology, MIT Press, 2003. 
10 Graeme Gooday, Domesticating Electricity: Technology, Uncertainty and Gender 
1880-1914, Pickering and Chatto, 2008; Nurcin Ileri, A Nocturnal History of Fin 
du Siècle Istanbul, PhD thesis, SUNY Binghampton, 2015; Natalia Nikiforova, 
‘When the phonograph came to Russia’, 
https://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/news/article/2780/when_the_phonograph_came
_to_russia [published 12 January 2016, accessed 10 February 2017]. 
11 Chandra Mukerji, Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the 
Canal du Midi, Princeton University Press, 2009; Ken Alder, Engineering the 
Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815, University of Chicago 
Press, 1997; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and 
National Indentity after WWII, MIT Press, 2009. 
12 Whitney E. Laemmli, A case in pointe: romance and regimentation at the New 
York City Ballet’, Technology and Culture 56, 1: 1-27, p.1. On bound feet as 
 11 
                                                                                                                                          
discipline and bound feet and labor, see Dorothy Ko, Cinderella’s Sisters: A 
Revisionist History of Foot-Binding, California University Press, 2005; Laurel 
Bossen, Wang Xurui, Melissa J. Brown, and Hill Gates, ‘Feet and Fabrication: 
Footbinding and Early Twentieth-Century Rural Women’s Labor in Shaanxi’, 
Modern China 37, 4 (2011): 347-383. 
13 Lee Vinsel and Andrew Russell, ‘Hail the Maintainers’, Aeon (online magazine 
https://aeon.co/essays/innovation-is-overvalued-maintenance-often-matters-
more ) [accessed 10 February 2017]. 
14 Francesca Bray, ‘Technics and civilization in Late Imperial China: an essay in 
the cultural history of technology’, Osiris 13 (1999): 11-33. 
15 George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology, Cambridge, 1988: 15.  
16 Svante Lindqvist ‘Changes in the technological landscape: the temporal 
dimension in the growth and decline of large technological systems’, in Ore 
Granstrand (ed), Economics of Technology, Amsterdam, 1994: 271-288; Jon 
Sigurdson, ‘A New Technological Landscape in China’, China Perspectives 42: 37-
53. 
17 Wiebe Bijker, ‘American and Dutch coastal engineering: differences in risk 
conception and differences in technological culture’, Social Studies of Science 37 
(2007):143–152; Bray, Technology, Gender and History: 5. 
18 M. Flitsch, ‘Knowledge, embodiment, skill and risk: anthropological 
perspectives on women’s everyday technologies in rural North China’, East 
Asian Science, Technology and Society 2, 2 (2008): 265-288. 
19 Cho-ying Li, ‘Contending strategies, collaboration among local specialists and 
officials, and hydrological reform in the late fifteenth-century Lower Yangzi 
Delta’, East Asian Science, Technology and Society 4, 2 (2010): 229-253. 
20 I make use of technological culture in Technology, Gender and History (passim) 
and in Francesca Bray, ‘Technological Transitions’, in The Cambridge History of 
the World, vol. 6 part 1, The Construction of a Global World, 1400-1800 C.E., 
edited by Merry Wiesner-Hanks, Jerry H. Bentley and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015: 76-106. I applied the paired concepts to 
analyze the role of technology in China’s transition to modernity in Francesca 
Bray, ‘Technology’, in Howard Chiang (ed), The Making of the Human Sciences in 
China: Historical and Conceptual Foundations (Leiden, forthcoming 2017). 
21 Flitsch, ‘Knowledge’: 268. 
22 Christian Daniels, Volume 6, Biology and Biological Technology, Part III, Agro-
industries and Forestry. Agro-industries: Sugarcane Technology, in Joseph 
Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
23 Peer Högselius, Arne Kaijser and Erik van der Vleuten, Europe’s Infrastructure 
Transition: Economy, War, Nature, Springer, 2015: xiii. 
24 Bray, Technology, Gender and History. 
25  Thomas J. Misa, Leonardo to the Internet: Technology and Culture from the 
Renaissance to the Present, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004: 1-32.  
26 Francesca Bray, Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial 
China, California University Press, 1997; Jacob Eyferth, ‘Women's Work and the 
Politics of Homespun in Socialist China, 1949–1980’, International Review of 
Social History 57, 3 (2012): 365-391. 
27 Misa, Leonardo, passim. 
 12 
                                                                                                                                          
28 Here beer and brewing play a starring role, evoking the similar prominence of 
saké production and fermentation more generally in the development of 
manufacturing in Tokugawa Japan; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The technological 
transformation of Japan: From the seventeenth to the twenty-first century, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
29 Eda Kranakis, ‘Surveying technology and history: Essential tensions and 
postmodern possibilities’, Technology and Culture 46.4 (2005): 805-812; p. 807. 
30 ibid: 809, emphases added. 
31 Misa, Leonardo: 57. 
32 Francesca Bray, `Science, technique, technology: passages between matter and 
knowledge in imperial Chinese agriculture’, British Journal for the History of 
Science 41, 3 (2008): 319-344. There I briefly discuss key technologies of the 
Chinese state, and I compare the styles and strategies of agricultural treatises to 
show the tensions and contradictions between the technological cultures of 
state officials and land-owners. 
33 Christine Moll-Murata, Song Jianze and Hans Ulrich Vogel (eds) Chinese 
Handicraft Regulations of the Qing Dynasty: Theory and Application, Iudicum, 
2005; Gugong bowuguan (Palace Museum), Gongting yu difang : shiqi zhi shiba 
shiji de jishu jiaoliu (The court and the localities: technological knowledge 
circulation in the 17th and 18th century), Zijincheng Press,  2010. 
34 Esha Shah, ‘Telling otherwise: a historical anthropology of tank irrigation 
technology in South India’, Technology and Culture 49, no. 3 (2008): 652-674; pp 
653, 655. 
